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Abstract:
The rapid progress in medical technology makes it unavoidable to ration health care. In
the discussion how to ration many people claim that principles of justice in distributing
scarce resources should be applied. In this paper we argue that medical resources are not
scarce as such but scarcity is a necessary by-product of collective ﬁnancing arrangements
such as social health insurance. So the right question to ask is the determination of
the beneﬁt package of such an institution. Hartmut Kliemt is currently involved in a
commendable interdisciplinary research project in which principles of ‘prioritization’ of
medical care are studied. This contribution adds a speciﬁc perspective to this endeavour:
we ask how the goal of distributive justice can be interpreted in this context and compare
different approaches to implementing ‘just’ allocation mechanisms.
1. Introduction
The problem of distributive justice is primarily relevant for goods that are scar-
ce in an absolute sense such as pieces of land at the shore of Lake Constance
or tickets to the Vienna Opera Ball. For goods that can be produced and whose
quantity can thereby be augmented the access can in principle be left to the mar-
ket. These are then allocated according to the willingness-to-pay, which has the
advantage that the demand side sends signals to producers to increase produc-
tion in case of need and thereby to remove any scarcity. The allocation of these
goods does not create an issue of distributive justice, except in the very gene-
ral sense that citizens can differ in their ability-to-pay, which is related to their
ability to earn income. But this is a problem that is related not only to health
care services but to all goods that meet basic needs and that can be solved wi-
thin the system of taxes and transfers, for example by guaranteeing a minimum
income at or above the subsistence level.
What is special about health care? It is the fact that with these goods the
need—e.g. measured by the risk of illness—can differ tremendously among citi-
zens, in part, even if not exclusively, for reasons beyond the individuals control,
especially due to his genetic endowment. As a consequence, in an unregulated
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market for private health insurance contracts the so-called ‘high risks’ must pay
higher premiums for the same insurance coverage than ‘low risks’. This fact is
seen by many as an injustice by nature which can be—at least with respect to
its ﬁnancial consequences—corrected by government. By establishing a manda-
tory insurance with open enrolment and community rating (more precisely, the
prohibition of risk-related premiums) it can ensure that low risks bear an equal
share of the ﬁnancial burden of high risks. The above mentioned properties of
mandatory membership, open enrolment and community rating are characteri-
stics of ‘social’ health insurance.1
Once the basic decision has been taken to establish a social health insurance,
it has to be decided what shall be its beneﬁt package and the rules that govern its
functioning, in particular how it is ﬁnanced. These questions can be addressed
with respect to criteria of distributive justice, but other normative principles
such as efﬁciency, freedom and conformity with the rule of law are applicable as
well.
In this contribution we shall try to survey the health economics literature
with respect to the question what normative requirements must be met in the
determination of the beneﬁt package of a social health insurance in a democratic
state committed to the rule of law. To this end, we shall ﬁrst argue (in Section 2)
why the answer can not be the trivial one that all ‘medically necessary’ services
must be included in this beneﬁt package. In Section 3 we shall discuss the set of
‘other’ normative requirements in greater detail and apply it to the determina-
tion of the beneﬁt package before we turn to the central question of distributive
justice in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to a special problem, viz. the just allo-
cation of absolutely scarce commodities in health care, which we shall answer
using the example of allocating human organs for transplantation, and Section
6 concludes.
At this point, the reader might miss a question that is frequently addressed
in the context of distributive justice in health care, namely how health care pro-
viders shall allocate the scarce resources in their command (operating rooms, ti-
me of physicians and nurses, medical supplies) in a just way, when more patients
need medical treatment than can be treated at the same time. This question of
‘rationing at the bedside’ or (expressed more nobly) ‘microallocation at the lower
level’ (Engelhardt 1986, 346; Dietrich et al. 2003; Rosenmayer 2007), which is
relevant especially in triage situations, is in my view of lesser importance, if
not altogether avoidable once the primary problem of determining the beneﬁt
package of social health insurance has been solved in a consistent manner. I
shall return to this assertion in Section 3.2.
1 See, e.g. Breyer and Zweifel 2006. Some economists claim that the same objective can also be rea-
ched with other instruments, in particular a combination of private insurance and a compensation
in the tax-transfer system. On this see Oberender et al. 2006; Zweifel and Breuer 2006; Kifmann
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2. On the Finiteness of Resources in the Health Care Sector
Consider a society in which health services are ﬁnanced through mandatory
contributions and supplied to the patient at zero or negligible cost. If we further
assume that the political system is democratic, then it follows that society must
somehow decide on the rules which should govern the provision of collectively
ﬁnanced services to the consumers and the ﬁnancing of the ensuing costs.
The most extreme option would run as follows: Based on a clear-cut deﬁnition
of the term ‘health service’ all citizens have a claim to receive all health services
that they demand or, respectively, that are prescribed by an acknowledged phy-
sician. Corresponding to popular language, this option would be called ‘absence
of rationing’.2 If, however, rationing is deﬁned as ‘allocation by the government,
free of charge’, this system should be considered an unlimited allocation. A cru-
cial feature of this option is that the share of health care expenditures in the
GDP can not be politically controlled but rather depends upon the development
of medical technology.
We now have to ask whether this rule would be compatible with the princip-
les evoked above, in particular efﬁciency and freedom:
1. A ‘blank cheque’ for all health related services can lead to a Pareto ef-
ﬁcient allocation only if the utility functions of all citizens give absolute
priority to health care in the sense that any two consumption bundles are
lexographically ranked according to the amount of this commodity. The
well-known examples of human behavior which is detrimental to one’s he-
alth clearly show that this condition is not met in the real world. Moreover,
given the rapid medical progress and population ageing, the percentage of
GDP that can be spent meaningfully on health services will increase tre-
mendously in the next decades. On the other hand, it is doubtful if the
majority of the population would want to spend the most part of their in-
come just on extending life longer and longer, regardless of how much is
left over for maintaining the standard of living.
2. If the condition on preferences mentioned above is not met, then the exis-
tence of insurance against health care costs (which, by itself, is welfare-
increasing if people are risk-averse and sickness has some random ele-
ment) leads to the phenomenon of moral hazard in the sense that the ins-
urance distorts the price ratio between health care and other goods and
thus induces over-consumption of the former (Pauly 1968). Theoretical-
ly, the ideal solution to this dilemma would be an ‘indemnity insurance’,
where the insurance payment depends only upon the type and severity of
illness, but not on the consumption of health services (Zweifel et al. 2009,
chap. 6). As the health status can not be perfectly measured, a second-best
solution to the dilemma seems to consist in co-payment rules. ‘Rationing’
can be interpreted as a special case of co-payment in a collectively ﬁnanced
2 The well-known American health economist Victor Fuchs (1984) calls the absence of rationing
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insurance plan, in which only two co-payment rates are used, namely 0 per
cent (for all services covered by the plan) and 100 per cent (for all other
services). Although it is implausible that an optimal insurance contract
should specify only these two co-payment rates, one could argue that in
the presence of transaction costs such a regulation can be taken as a ﬁrst
approximation to an optimal plan with several co-payment rates.
3. Finally, it is likely that citizens differ with respect to their individual pre-
ferences for length of life versus standard of living (consumption level),
which implies that they differ in their views on what should ideally be co-
vered by a health insurance plan if they had to pay for the expected costs of
the plan. This consideration, taken by itself, seems to suggest that accor-
ding to the principle of liberty every citizen should be allowed to choose his
own insurance coverage. However, the maintenance of a mandatory ins-
urance with collective ﬁnancing can be defended on distributive grounds:
as the only feasible way to redistribute from the good to the bad risks.
Hence, there is the trade-off between the principles of liberty and distri-
butive justice, and depending on the relative weights a larger or smaller
beneﬁt package of the mandatory plan is optimal.
3. Other Normative Requirements
Before we turn to the central question of justice, we shall argue that a number
of other normative criteria should also be met by rationing through the beneﬁt
package of a social health insurance.
3.1 Liberty
In a liberal society, the government must acknowledge the different preferences
of the citizens. This implies especially that market transactions like the ex-
change of health care services for money can not be prohibited without com-
pelling justiﬁcation. This principle applies both to direct health care providers
such as physicians in private practice and private hospitals and to suppliers of
health insurance contracts. Therefore the beneﬁt package of social health in-
surance can not be exclusive in the sense that it is legally prohibit to privately
produce and trade services that are not included—unless the services themsel-
ves are illegal or immoral such as certain kinds of euthanasia. A prohibition on
the private purchase of medical services would indeed be futile unless it exten-
ded to all non-medical goods and services that are suitable to prolong human life
such as healthy food and safe cars.
Moreover it would have to be enforced with instruments of the police state
and would still be ineffective as long as the government is unable to prevent
private purchase of health care services abroad. A ‘surgery tourism’—analogous
to the ‘abortion tourism’ observed between Germany and the Netherlands only a
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of view of distributive justice, since the high travel costs associated with it make
it not only inefﬁcient but have the effect that only the well-to-do can afford to
take part.
All these reasons suggest a two-tier system of health care ﬁnancing in which
tier 1 consist of a collectively ﬁnanced basic beneﬁt package which is ensured
through mandatory membership and payment of contributions, whereas tier 2
is given by a free market for private supplementary services and private supple-
mentary health insurance contracts (see, e.g. the bio-ethicist Engelhardt 1986,
361).
3.2 Conformity with the Rule of Law
If the principle is accepted that private purchase of those health care services
that are not included in the beneﬁt package of social health insurance must be
allowed and that the same holds for supplementary health insurance contracts,
then it is a plausible claim that the beneﬁt package itself should not vary ar-
bitrarily according to the situation of scarcity. Only if this basic coverage has
transparently speciﬁed gaps and limitations, can these gaps be ﬁlled by purcha-
sing private supplementary insurance contracts at a time when it is not yet
predictable who will need the respective services for a prolongation of his life.
This is important because in the presence of risk aversion the coverage through
a private insurance contract at actuarial premia is preferred by everybody to the
mere possibility to purchase the additional services at one’s own expense in the
case of need.
Moreover, according to the Rule of Law, the claims and obligations of every
citizen against a collectively ﬁnanced health insurance system should be unequi-
vocally deﬁned so that they can be subjected to scrutiny in front of a court. This
very principle would be violated by rationing at the bedside since in this case the
insurance coverage by deﬁnition does not specify exactly which medical services
the individual citizen is entitled to in case of illness. E.g. Höﬂing (1998, 152)
points out that the German Grundgesetz prohibits a delegation of responsibility
for life-and-death decisions to the micro level.
By the same token, the much quoted ‘prioritization’ of certain patient groups
or kinds of treatment is not compatible with the rule of law. First of all, the term
itself is a euphemism which serves in the political discourse to embellish the
bleak reality: what is truly at stake is ‘posteriorization’, i.e. in times of ﬁnancial
tightness, e.g. due to a ﬁxed period budget certain patients will not be treated,
at least not with the medically indicated treatment. The consequence is that the
contribution to social health insurance loses its speciﬁed quid pro quo.
On the other hand, the ﬂipside of a ﬁxed beneﬁt package is that total ex-
penditures of social health insurance can not be determined in advance since
somebody must bear the aggregate morbidity risk. If both the beneﬁt package
and the contribution rate are ﬁxed, the consequence is either hidden rationing,
or physicians must provide additional services free of charge. As they will resist
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while. In the long run, a ﬁxed beneﬁt package will mean that the contributi-
on rate to social health insurance will vary over time, which is the price to be
paid for the gain in legal certainty. However, it is an open question whether the
majority of the citizens is willing to pay this price.
3.3 Efﬁciency
Finally, in the design of the beneﬁt package of social health insurance, the target
of efﬁciency must not be neglected. This principle requires that for a variety of
reasons, not all costs of medical care should be covered completely by the manda-
tory insurance plan. One of these reasons are administrative costs of processing
(small) claims, an even more important one is moral hazard, i.e. the efffect of
being insured on the incentives for preventive efforts and for the utilization of
medical care once an illness has occurred. To the extent that full coverage incre-
ases health care utilization, the advantages of risk spreading must be weighed
against the disadvantages of a more expensive insurance plan when coverage is
increased.
These considerations suggest that the diagnosis and treatment of an illness
should be more likely included in the beneﬁt package of social health insurance,
• the more it is life-threatening,
• the stronger its genetic component and
• the less the insured can affect its process through his oen behavior.
4. Justice in the Design of a Beneﬁt Package
4.1 Procedural Justice
The well-known medical ethicist Georg Marckmann (2006) has proposed a set of
criteria which refer not to the justice of the resulting beneﬁt package itself, but
rather to the procedure of designing such a package. This set includes
1. the transparency of the process,
2. the implementation by a democratically legitimized institution,
3. the possibility for important groups of stakeholders to participate,
4. consistency (i.e. equal criteria of inclusion for all types of illnesses),
5. opportunities to appeal.
In this list, requirements no. 1, 2 and 5 appear to be indispensable under the
rule of law, although in the status quo (e.g. in Germany), transparency seems to
be badly lacking. Requirement no. 3 can be deemed problematic, since it carries
the danger of undue inﬂuence of well-organized lobby groups. Requirement no. 4
is not entirely procedural but extends already to the material content and thus
seems to need a special justiﬁcation (e.g. equal treatment of different patient
groups). Moreover, it seems to be obvious that procedural justice alone does not
sufﬁce, but there are certain material requirements that have to be met in the
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4.2 Justice and Equality
On a very basic level a consensus seems to be possible that—in particular with
respect to state-controlled schemes of resource allocation—justice implies equal
treatment of equals under comparable circumstances. However, it is questio-
nable what ‘equal treatment’ exactly means. In the context of the health care
system here are several possible reference points:
a) equality in the formal access to health care services (i.e. absence of privile-
ges for certain groups); this is a very weak requirement, although one that
is violated in Germany due to the co-existence of social and private health
insurance with different modes of reimbursement of services,
b) equal chances to beneﬁt from the services of the public health care system:
this implies that everybody counts the same in cost-beneﬁt calculations on
which the design of the beneﬁt package is based,
c) the right to achievement of the same result with respect to life expectancy
and quality of life (health status), if medically possible: this is the most far-
reaching requirement which forces the government to engage in a maxi-
mum level of activity designed to even out congenital differences in health
status.3
While requirement a) seems to be hardly controversial and requirement c) will
be too far-reaching for many, the true problem seems to lie in the operationali-
zation of requirement b), a task to which the next section will be devoted.
4.3 Justice and the Veil of Uncertainty
An instrument used to generate and justify intuitions about justice, which has
been well established in many areas of distribution of scarce commodities is
the so-called ‘veil of uncertainty’: If I did not know my own health fortune and
therefore did not know in which role (as a patient or as a contributor) I would
be primarily affected by a particular regulation in social health insurance, what
decision would I take in my own interest? The veil of uncertainty tries to solve
distributional conﬂicts by modelling the allocation problem as an intrapersonal
one instead of an interpersonal one. This construction ought to facilitate the
ﬁnding of a consensus: when everybody is in the same situation, conﬂicts of
interest are suppressed so that the question of justice is reduced to a question of
efﬁciency: Only a solution that is efﬁcient after the veil is lifted can be equitable
before the veil.
This procedure can be reﬁned by knitting the veil in different degrees of
thickness: in the extreme case, the decision maker is virtually in his mother’s
womb and does not even know if he will be born as a boy or a girl. Another im-
portant distinction is whether the decision maker already knows his preferences
or not.
3 This goal is not meant to imply that people with very good health prospects should be harmed
to achieve equality with the less fortunate. On this see the famous ‘levelling-down’ debate, e.g.
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4.3.1 Ignorance of the Own Preferences
In the extreme case, individual preferences do not yet exist, i.e. the decision
maker must rely on ‘representative preferences’. For this situation there are
a number of plausible decision rules that differ from each other mainly in the
kind of risk preferences of the representative individual that are assumed and
whether health and consumption are assumed to be substitutable goods:
a) Without specifying the particular structure of preferences of the represen-
tative individual, it seems obvious that expected utility should be maxi-
mized and that the expected value should be calculated by using the pro-
babilities of the various possible illnesses. However, this approach is still
too unspeciﬁc to give speciﬁc support in the decision whether to include a
certain medical service in the beneﬁt package of social health insurance.
b) If full complementarity between health and consumption and risk neu-
trality with respect to health is assumed, then utility maximization of
the representative individual requires maximization of additional QALYs
(‘quality-adjusted life years’) from a ﬁxed health care budget (Bleichrodt
and Quiggin 1999).4 This is equivalent to setting a ﬁxed threshhold va-
lue for costs per QALY, which should not be exceeded.5 This decision rule
seems to underlie current practice in the British NHS. It is based on the
implicit assumption that the yet unborn citizen values an additional QA-
LY always equally, no matter in which situation it will accrue to him—an
assumption which contradicts not only our intuitions but also wide-spread
experience. We know both from theoretical considerations and from em-
pirical studies (e.g. Dolan et al. 2005) that many people care most for an
improvement in health when the initial health status is low (e.g. in life-
threatening situations) and that health is valued most when there is no
general poverty but a satisfactory level of consumption.
c) If the assumption of risk neutrality in health is replaced by extreme risk
aversion, then one arrives at the Rawlsian maximin rule, which implies
that help has to be provided ﬁrst and foremost to those whose health sta-
tus is worst, no matter how big or small their gain in QALYs is, as long
as it is positive. In medical ethics this rule is well-known as ‘rule of res-
cue’; it enjoys great popularity in situations of triage (see, e.g. McKie and
Richardson 2003). It is, however, doubtful if it should govern the design of
the beneﬁt package of social health insurance as a whole.
We conclude that the procedure described so far allows speciﬁc recommendati-
ons on the beneﬁt package only if very special—and most probably unrealistic—
assumptions on the preferences of the representative individual are taken. In
4 Moreover, the attempt to measure ‘health-related quality of life’ by a number between 0 and 1 is
highly debated. One important issue is whether this assessment should be made by persons in
the respective health state or by ‘healthy’ persons who imagine being in such a state. On this see
Ubel et al. 2000; Nord 2001.
5 This rule must be slightly modiﬁed if there is a private market for supplementary health care
services besides social health insurance. In this case, the absolute level of treatment costs also
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contrast, if one tried to elicit the actual preferences of real persons, one would
encounter severe difﬁculties since this would require answers to highly hypo-
thetical questions. It is totally unclear how one could motivate real persons so
answer this kind of question sincerely and in such a way that the stated prefe-
rences had predictive value for real behavior at a later stage. On the other hand,
this procedure has the important advantage that far-reaching real uncertainty
makes a real (as opposed to ﬁctitious) consensus much more likely than behind
a thinner veil of uncertainty.
4.3.2 Knowledge of Own Preferences
In this analysis real persons are confronted with two types of questions:
1. Which share of GDP shall be devoted to the health care sector, given the
current state of medical technology and assuming that every citizen will
have an equal claim to a share of health care services—in terms of health
insurance beneﬁts?
2. How shall the health care budget determined above be divided among the
various illnesses, i.e. how shall the beneﬁt package of a social health ins-
urance be designed under this budget constraint? In asking this question,
the respondent has to take the probabilities of the various diseases from
the empirical distribution of relative frequencies.
This procedure, which could be termed ‘self-rationing’, allows to make sensible
reﬂections even on delicate questions such as different weights placed on ser-
vices delivered to patients in different ages without raising negative connotati-
ons. For suppose the respondent places a higher weight on services for younger
patients, then he does so because behind the veil of uncertainty (i.e. before he
knows whether he is afﬂicted by a life-threatening, but curable disease when he
is young or when he is old) he takes the avoidance of death at a young age as
more important than at an old age—if only for the reason that you do not reach
an old age if you have died young because you have not provided for treatment
of a curable disease.6
There is, however, an ambiguity in interpreting the answers on this kind of
questions: Do the answers express what the respondent wants for himself or do
they reﬂect his ‘ethical preferences’, i.e. what he thinks is ‘right’ for society as a
whole?
Furthermore, a broad application of this procedure fails due to its lack of
practicality: If one wanted to elicit citizen’s preferences for the different alloca-
tions of a given total of insurance coverage over the life cycle, one should exclu-
sively ask persons for whom the veil of uncertainty has not yet been liftet—a
requirement that can not be met in practice. If at all, then this condition can be
fulﬁlled by young adults who have the largest part of life with all its risks still
before them. But even a young person already has certain pieces of informati-
on on his genetic endowment and his previous health history so that complete
6 This argument is due to the philosopher Norman Daniels (1996).404 Friedrich Breyer
uncertainty no longer prevails. In addition, questions on the just distribution of
health services between children and adults as well as between men and women
are, for obvious reasons, not accessible in this way.
A further objection against this type of questions is that serious deliberation
on one’s own long-term preferences especially on life and death seems to require
some amount of experience of life, so that this creates an obvious dilemma: the
older the respondent, the more experienced he is and the more able to have
formed stable preferences, but the more the veil of uncertainty is already liftet.
Still, this type of questioning has already been used to elicit preferences on
the design of speciﬁc health care interventions, e.g. by Gyrd-Hansen and Kris-
tiansen (2008). These authors asked respondents if—in case of a serious but fre-
quent disease (myocardial infarction)—they preferred a treatment with a high
probability of a small gain in life expectancy or one with a small probability of a
large gain.
In Germany this line of research is pursued by the Research Unit 655 sup-
ported by the German Research Foundation, which works under the heading
‘Prioritizing in Medicine: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis in Considerati-
on of the Public Health Insurance System’ and of which Hartmut Kliemt is a
member. One of the primary goals of this research is “to look for prioritizati-
ons respecting the interests and wishes of all parties involved, patients, physi-
cians and citizens”. It remains to be seen whether this research will focus on
self-interested preferences of respondents or on preferences on the allocation of
scarce resources among other persons, to which we turn in the next section.
4.4 Just Distribution as Judged by the Unaffected: The Approach
of ‘Empirical Ethics’
As argued above, concepts of justice which rely on the veil of uncertainty often
lack practical implementability. This is also true of Rawlsian concepts in the mo-
re narrow sense, which are based on a normatively determined ‘veil of ignorance’
and not only ‘veil of uncertainty’. These concepts try to abstract from direct in-
terests of the evaluator by withholding particular information, but they picture
the decision always from the perspective of the participant, not the non-involved
third party. This feature distinguishes it from the idea that impartiality of an
external observer can ensure the fairness of the judgement: he who is not af-
fected by a decision can be expected to deliver an unbiased verdict. In other
contexts, committees are asked to set rules that do not come into effect before
the term of the present committee has expired. Quite generally, this conception
of the making of fair judgements ﬁts well into procedures that use expert groups
to prepare a decision.
The same idea is underlying the concept of ‘empirical ethics’, which is ad-
vanced by authors such as Nord (1999) and Richardson and McKie (2005). This
concept has been implemented in a number of empirical studies in which re-
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tributional problems which focused on the prioritization of patient groups which
differ from each other in certain dimensions, e.g.:
• health status before treatment (on a 0-1-scale),
• the expected gain in health through the treatment,
• age,
• responsibility for own children,
• whether the disease was caused by their own behavior
(for a survey see Dolan et al. 2005). The most remarkable result of these studies
was that the decision rule implicitly used differed signiﬁcantly from a simple
maximization of QALYs, as it is obviously intended by the British NHS.
A particularly interesting variant of this kind of studies is the so-called
‘person-trade-off’-method (see, e.g., Pinto-Prades 1997). Here the respondents
are confronted with questions like: ‘project A will save the lives of 4 pedestrians
in the age group 5 to 15 years, project B will save the lives of 6 car-drivers aged
25-35. Which one do you prefer?’ A large number of binary questions like this
allow determining a ‘marginal rate of substitution between saving lives of the
two respective patient types’, from the point of view of the respondent. A recent
study based on this method (Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson 2008) ﬁnds
that ‘ethical preferences’ established in this way attached the saving of a human
life a value which is decreasing in the patient’s age, higher for pedestrians than
for motorists and higher for parents than for childless adults.
Interestingly, however, the authors also ﬁnd that these pretendedly ‘impar-
tial’ preferences are indeed biased by the obvious interest of the respondent: for
instance, the extent to which younger patients are preferred decreases with the
age of the respondent, and people with children attach a higher weight to pati-
ents with children than do childless respondents. In the same vein, Feuerstein
(1998, 195) criticizes that committees composed of physicians and citizens have
a bias to decide in favor of ‘people like us’.
While this type of questioning has the obvious advantage of principal feasib-
lity, the equity intuitions elicited in this way can be interpreted as some kind of
“ethics from the driver’s seat” (Kliemt 2001), and it is thus disputable whether
they should form the basis of political decision making in a liberal and democra-
tic state that is committed to the rule of law: should the government given its
ﬁnancial resources
a) allocate to each citizen what the majority of the people grants him
or should it
b) take the interests of each citizen as a guideline for its actions?
While Option a) emphasizes the principles of democracy, it has a certain collecti-
vistic ﬂavor and is supported by authors such as Jeff Richardson or Erik Nord7
who have a proximity to communitarian ethics. In contrast, Option b) departs
from the right of the individual citizen to determine his own fortune as long as
he does not impinge upon the rights of his fellow citizens.
7 See, e.g., Richardson and McKie 2005; Nord 1999.406 Friedrich Breyer
One might argue that, if at all, method a) is appropriate in situations in
which the respondents do not belong to the group of people to whom the ratio-
ning process applies, but are either part of the tax-paying community that spon-
sors the health services in question or totally unaffected observers. The ﬁrst case
applies to the famous Oregon priority setting process in which members of the
community were asked to state their value judgments with respect to the beneﬁt
package that the state was to make available to Medicaid beneﬁciaries free of
charge (see, e.g., Garland 1992). Eventually, after the adoption of a priority list,
the state legislature increased the funds allocated to this program. This can be
seen as an indication of a Pareto improvement being achieved by determining a
beneﬁt package according to the value judgments of the sponsors.
However, even the advocates of the approach of ‘empirical ethics’ seem to
mistrust the results of their own method, because they see the danger that the
respondents exhibit “biased, intolerant and dogmatic preferences” (Richardson
and McKie 2005, 272). Therefore they propose to “launder preferences” and to
exclude “those preferences that have nothing to contribute to social welfare” in
order to determine “acceptable social preferences” and “legitimate social values”
(ibid., 273). This proposal obviously begs the question who shall decide which
preferences are ‘legitimate’ or ‘acceptable’ (maybe Richardson and McKie them-
selves?) and, once a satisfactory answer to this latter question is found, why one
wants to bother to ask the people to begin with?
5. Just Distribution of Absolutely Scarce Resources:
The Case of Transplants
A speciﬁc problem is involved in the allocation of those health care goods and
services whose quantity can not (at least not without great effort) be augmented,
what is true in particular of human transplants. Since these are scarce, patients
must die on the waiting list—in Germany every year at least 1000 persons. This
constitutes a genuine problem of microallocation which also can not be avoided.
It is all the more important for the (potentially) affected people—in principle this
is everybody—that the rules that regulate this allocation process are accepted
by the population as equitable.
Consider the algorithms of organ allocation which are prescribed by the Ger-
man Transplantation Act (TPG) and which are applied by the Eurotransplant
network. According to §12(3) TPG they reﬂect exclusively medical criteria, which
are
• the urgency of the transplantation for the patient,
• the success probability, as gauged by the blood and tissue compatibility of
donor and recipient,
• the waiting time, and
• the country of residence (through the regard to international exchange
balances).Health Care Rationing and Distributive Justice 407
Of these criteria, only the ﬁrst one is genuinely medical, as it is derived from
the duty to help in life-threatening situations (‘rule of rescue’). The second one
is guised as a medical one, but its justiﬁcation betrays its utilitarian character,
since it originates from the target to gain as many QALYs as possible from a
given pool of donated organs. Unfortunately, it stands in stark contrast to the
ﬁrst criterion as patients who need a transplant with high urgency are often
already in a bad health status which impairs the chances of success.
The waiting time, however, is a clear case of an equity criterion, which can
be diametrically oppopsed to the ‘medical’ criterion of maximizing the success
probability because with increasing time on the waiting list the success rate falls
signiﬁcantly, in particular for the case of kidney transplants (Meyer-Kriesche
and Kaplan 2002). Finally, the observance of international exchange balances
can only be justiﬁed with criteria of equity: citizens of countries which contribute
more to the procurement of transplants (e.g. because of the different national
organ extraction laws) should beneﬁt from the pool accordingly. This is quite
obviously a non-medical rule, although it is perfectly plausible, because without
organ procurement there would be no organ transplantations.
Not only for reasons of providing incentives for donation, but also from the
point of view of equity (‘do ut des’) it suggests itself to apply an analogous crite-
rion to the allocation of scarce transplants on the individual level as well and to
take the (previous) willingness to donate of the patient into account.8
It is therefore astonishing that the German Ethics Council so vehemently
dismissed this idea in its statement on the scarcity of transplants in 2007 (Na-
tionaler Ethikrat 2007). The members of the council argue that it was an esta-
blished principle of the German statutory health insurance (GKV) that the ac-
cess to health care should not depend upon the patient’s own previous behavior.
This line of argument is not convincing since the claim to beneﬁts from the GKV
does require a particular previous behavior, namely the payment of contributi-
ons. Moreover, there is an obvious analogy between the payment of contributions
and the willingness to donate one’s organs after death because as much as no
health care services can be provided by the GKV without the necessary ﬁnan-
cial resources by the members, no transplantations can be performed without
donated transplants.9
6. Concluding Remarks
I summarize my considerations on the application of criteria of distributve ju-
stice on the ﬁeld of health services in eight propositions:
1. Distributive justice in health care is not primarily a matter of micro al-
location at the bedside or of ‘prioritization’. To the contrary, the room for
8 This principle of ‘reciprocity’ was ﬁrst developed by Lederberg (1967) and has been vigorously
advocated by Hartmut Kliemt for almost two decades. See, e.g., Kliemt 1993.
9 For a more detailed analysis see Breyer and Kliemt 2007.408 Friedrich Breyer
decisions by individual health care providers on the allocation of collec-
tively ﬁnanced services should be limited to the application of transparent
rules.
2. Once a state has decided to implement a collectively ﬁnanced health care
system, it should deﬁne the beneﬁt package of this system as transparent-
ly as possible. For reasons of scarcity, an unlimited public provision of he-
alth care services can not be optimal.
3. In a liberal society, a two-tiers system of medicine—basic services for all,
supplementary services for those who are willing to pay for them—is un-
avoidable. This does not amount to ‘two-class medicine’ as long as every
citizen can decide which supplementary services to demand.
4. An enlightened society of the 21st century should have an open debate on
the beneﬁt package of a social health insurance.
5. There is a multitude of well-founded concepts of distributive justice. The
result does not have to be the one chosen by Great Britain: the maximiza-
tion of QALYs from a ﬁxed budget.
6. The approach of ‘empirical ethics’ has the advantage of trying to elicit the
real preferences of real citizens, but it has certain paternalistic features
that are not compatible with a liberal society.
7. A guideline for inclusion in the beneﬁt package of social health insurance
should be that citizens wish to obtain these services for themselves.
8. With absolutely scarce commodities (human transplants) the allocation
should also take the willingness to provide them into account.
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